Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1896

The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency
Amos S. Hershey
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the International Law Commons, Latin American History Commons, and the Latin American
Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Hershey, Amos S., "The Recognition of Cuban Belligerency" (1896). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 1963.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1963

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

BRIEFER COMMUNICATIONS.
THE RECOGNITION OF CUBAN BELLIGERENCY.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the undoubted right
and propriety on the part of the United States Government to accord
belligerent rights to the Cuban insurgents.
It must be confessed, however, at the outset, that it is very difficult
to see what immediate'practical -benefits the Cubans are to- enjoy as a
result of these rights, so far as the conduct of the war against Spain
is concerned, inasmuch as they are in no position to exercise them.
Such recognition by the United States would doubtless give them
much moral aid and encouragement in inspiring increased hope and
enthusiasm in the Cuban breast, and might induce, many natives and
even foreigners to enter the Cuban ranks.* It would dignify their
struggle in the eyes of the civilized world, and would probably enable
them to borrow money and float their bonds. It would entitle them
to the rights of war as far as the United States are concerned, but
their relations with Spain or other governments would not be affected,
unless other governments should be induced to follow, our example.
Recognition of Cuban belligerency by the United States implies in
itself, however, no more than a declaration of strict and impartial
neutrality between the two parties. To both of them are accorded
belligerent rights and upon both of them are imposed belligerent
duties in the struggle which we consider as actual war. It means
that we at least do not look upon the Cubans as rebels and pirates,
and that we think them entitled to all the privileges of honorable warfare and capable of fulfilling neutral obligations. However, should
either party fail to observe the most elementary rules of civilized warfare, we should probably remonstrate, and if necessary intervene.
Recognition implies to the Cubans no aid or support other than
moral, nor would it give them any special advantage over Spain. We
on the contrary bind ourselves to the observance of a stricter neutrality, if possible, than beforet and we accord to both parties certain
rights which only one of the parties in this contest (Spain) is in a
* It would seem, however, according to the statements of the Cuban leaders,
that (as in the case of the previous revolution of 1868-78) arms and ammunitionnot men are needed.
t At present we are bound merely by our own Neutrality Acts, i. e., by 3hunicipal
law, which we are under no obligation to Spain to observe. , Recognition of Cuban
belligerency would place us under international obligations.
[450]
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The exercise of the most important

of these rights-that of searching our vessels for contraband goods on
the hig4 seas-would be of decided advantage to Spain, and would be
a right, which she alone would enjoy, inasmuch as the Cubans are not
at all in a position to exercise it, nor indeed are they likely to be in
such a position for some time to come, being in possession neither of
ports nor of commissioned cruisers. Again, as soon as the Cubans
are recognized as belligerents, the responsibility to the United States
for injury to the persons or property of American citizens within
Cuban territory is shifted from Spain to Cuba. Thus we see that the
Cubans.are not only in no position to exercise the more important
rights: of belligerency, but that 'they would become subject to
onerous duties. They would have the right, to be sure, to insist
upon the strict neutrality of the United States, but they could not
prevent the sale of contraband goods to their enemies-a strictly legal
business in itself, although Spain would be able to prevent such
sale to them. These points are not made to prove that the true
interests of the Cubans lie in remaining unrecognized by the United
States (for the moral support which such recognition would give them
would of course far outweigh these disadvantages); but merely to call
attention to the fact that the recognition of Cuban belligerency is in
itself not such a radical step and would not be so injurious to Spain
as some would have us think; and that such recognition would involve
some sacrifice on our part, and would not be of unmixed benefit to
Cuba.*
The importance attached to the recdgnition of Cuban belligerency
by the United States is in part due to the commanding position which
this nation occupies in the eyes of the civilized world. In greater
part, however, the importance attached to such a step is due to the
great and peculiar interest which the government and people of the
United States have always taken, since the early part of this century,
in the future of Cuba. '
This interest has been manifested in various ways. As early as 1823,
when a rumor had reached the United States to the effect that France
intended to take possession of Cuba, Mr. J. Q. Adams, Secretary of
State, wrote to Mr. Nelson, United States Minister in Spain, that
"these islands [referring to Cuba and Porto Rico], from their local
position, are natural appendages to the North American continent,
* General Campos, the former commander-in-chief of the Spanish forces, is
reported to hate said in an interview by the New York Times of December 8, 1895:
"Recognition of Cuban belligerency would have no serious consequences for
Spain. On the contrary, it would give us the advantage of having the right to
search American ships on the high seas, as well as enable us to stop many expeditions that otherwise would be able, from time to time, to slip in."
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and one of them [Cuba] almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its
commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the
West Indian seas; the character of its population, its situation midway between our Southern coast and the island of San Domingo; its
safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our
shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions
and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a
commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an
importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no
other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that
which binds the different members of this Union together." *
Jefferson, in a letter of June II, 1823, to President Monroe wrote:
"Its [Cuba's] possession by Great Britain would indeed be a great
calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its
independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly
as valuable as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not
immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts
will give it to us, or the island will give itself to us when able to do
so." He recommends a neutrality as partial to Spain as the circumstances would justify, but in another letter written a fortnight later,
June 23, 1823, he retracts his opinion and thinks " it is better to lie
still, in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself, for certainly her addition to our Confederacy is exactly
what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its
utmost interest." t
On the seventeenth of October, 1825, Mr. Clay was directed by President J. Q. Adams to announce to our ministers to the leading European
governments " that the United States for themselves desired no change
in the political condition of Cuba; that they were satisfied that it
should remain open as it now is, to their commerce, and that they
could not with indifference see it passing from Spain to any (other)
European power." And in instructions to Mr. Brown, Minister to
France, October 25, 1825, Mr. Clay wrote: "You will now add that
we could not consent to the occupation of those islands [Cuba and
Porto Rico] by any other European power than Spain under any
contingency whatever." f
Mr. Gallatin, when Minister at London, tried " to impress strongly
on his [Mr. Canning's] mind that it was impossible that the United
* Wharton's " Digest," Vol. i, p. 361.
t Ibid., pp. 366-67.
*5Ibid., p. 367,
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States could acquiesce in the conquest by, or transfer of, that island
[Cuba] to any great maritime power."
This policy with reference to Cuba was reiterated during the administrations of Jackson, Van Buren and Tyler, and found ardent exponents in Mr. Webster and Mr. Calhoun.*

President Polk, in 1848,

went so far as to authorize a direct proposal to Spain for the purchase of
Cuba, and, according to Von Holstjt Mr. Saunders, Minister to Spain,
was authorized by Secretary Buchanan to go as high in his offer as
$oo,ooo,ooo.
The proposition was, according to Secretary Clayton,
" considered by the Spanish Ministry as a national indignity, and
the sentiment of the ministry was responded to by the Cortes." It
was not, therefore, renewed by the succeeding administration.
In consequence, however, of three filibustering expeditions under
Lopez and the warm sympathy which they elicited in the South,
England and France proposed to the United States Government, in
1852, a tripartite agreement with reference to Cuba in the form of a
treaty, to the effect that the three " high contracting parties severally
and collectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to
obtain possession of the island of Cuba," and that they bind themselves not to " obtain or maintain, for themselves, or for any one of
themselves, any exclusive control over the said island, nor assume
nor exercise any dominion over the same." ( This proposition was
rejected by the United States on the grounds, as stated by Secretary
Everett, that " the policy of the United States has uniformly been to
avoid as far as possible alliances or agreements with other States, and
to keep itself free from national obligations, except such as affect
directly the interests of the United States themselves;" that
"although the President did not covet the acquisition of Cuba for
the United States, he at the same time considered the condition of
that island as mainly an American question;" that the proposed convention " assumed that the United States had no other or greater
interest in the question than France or England, whereas it was
necessary only to cast one's eye on the map to see how remote were
the relations of Europe and how intimate those of the United States
with this island." 1|
On October 8, 1854, after a revival of filibustering projects, the
interference on the part of the Cuban authorities with our commerce,
and the rights of American citizens, which culminated in the " Black
* Ibid., p. 369, etc.
f " History of the United States, 1846-50," p. 441.
I Wharton's "Digest," Vol. 1,p. 373.
" Monroe Doctrine," pp. 83-84.
Ibid., pp. 86--89; Snow, " American Diplomacy," p. 353.

(Tucker's
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Warrior" incident, the three ministers to England, France and
Spain respectively, Buchanan, Mason and Sould, acting under instructions of the administration, met at Ostend, for " a full and free interchange of views in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the
general object," * i. e., the purchase of Cuba. On the eighteenth of
October they signed the "Ostend Manifesto," addressed to Secretary
Marcy, in which they argued that " an immediate effort ought to be
made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from
Spain " at a sum not exceeding $12o,ooo,ooo,

and that the interest of

Spain would be " greatly and essentially promoted " by the sale of the
island to the United States. The manifesto went so far as to threaten
force, "if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated
by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell
Cuba to the United States." t This manifesto was not approved by
President Pierce, although Buchanan, as President, still continued to
urge the acquisition of Cuba in successive messages."
With the abolition of slavery in the United States, one of the main
causes of the agitation for the annexation of Cuba has ceased to exist,
and " although there has been much correspondence with Spain in
respect of Cuban affairs, active projects for the acquisition of the
island have not been revived by the government of the United
States." ( On the other hand, the projected construction of an Interoceanic Canal has supplied the advocates of annexation with a powerful argument, for as one writer observes, 11" It is plain, also, that any
increased facility of Isthmian transit, such as a successfully operated
canal, must result in placing the commerce benefited thereby more or
less under the supervision of the fleets which find a haven in her
[Cuba's] numerous harbors." Furthermore, the protracted struggle
of 1868-78, and the present insurrection (which promises to be a
repetition of the former on a larger scale) have made it more and
more evident that Spain can retain Cuba only at great cost to herself and at great discomfort and inconvenience to the United States.
Let us now examine the question of the right and propriety on the
part of the United States Government, under these and other circumstances which we shall consider, to recognize Cuban belligerency.
Cuba cannot claim a right of recognition, even if she were to file a
much stronger brief than she is capable of doing. Recognition of belligerency is an act of pure grace on the part of the neutral government,
* Executive Documents, Second Session, 33 d Congress.
t Ibid.
I Wharton's " Digest," pp. 381-83.
Snow's " American Diplomacy," P. 357.
Tucker's " Monroe Doctrine," pp. 77-78.
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and one which can be granted or withheld at pleasure. Those writers
who like Vattel and Bluntschli urge a right of recognition on grounds
of humanity and the like, evidently consider the moral rather than
the legal aspect of the question.
Recognition of belligerency is determined by two classes of facts:
the existence of actual war in the sense of international law, and the
policy or necessity of recognizing the existence of such a war on the
part of the neutral state. The former are questions of law; the latter
of policy.
The true ground of recognition as a matter of policy as stated by
Hall (one of the few writers who seems to have clear and definite
ideas on this subject) is " based upon a possibility that the interests
of a state may be so affected as to make recognition a reasonable
measure of self-protection."*
Hall distinguishes three cases in this connection: (I) The case of a
struggle in the midst of loyal and isolated provinces. In this instance,
he thinks, the question is one which can hardly arise. (2) The case
of a contiguous state. Here he admits that recognition is a possibility, and is, he says, at the option of the contiguous state. (3)
The case of maritime warfare. Here the presumption is in favor
of recognition. He even thinks recognition may be granted if a
reasonable expectation of such hostilities exists. t
It may seem difficult, perhaps, to place Cuba in any of the above
categories. We certainly cannot look upon her as an isolated province,
and there does not exist even the pretence of maritime warfare. But
to claim that she is not to all intents and purposes contiguous to our
territory would be sacrificing a great deal to the literal meaning of a
word. After all, the position of contiguity or non-contiguity is not an
essential part of the problem. It is an insignificant detail, and the
real ground or basis of recognition should be the matter of the commercial or property interests and the protection of the persons of our
own citizens. ,
Dana, in an invaluable note to Wheaton,t on the recognition of
belligerency, correctly states the question which the neutral state
must ask itself, as follows: " Whether its own rights and interests are
so far affected as to require a definition of its own relation to the
parties."
It seems clear that apart from any considerations arising out of our
feculiar interest in Cuba, our rights and interests are very seriously
threatened and affected by a prolonged struggle between Spain and
*Hall's "International Law," P. 35.
t Ibid., pp. 36-37.
1 Wheaton's (Dana's Ed.) " International Law," note

15,

PP. 34-39.
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the Cuban insurgents. Cuba has been in a state of more or less active
or slumbering revolution ever since the period in which the SpanishAmerican Colonies achieved their independence, and in the struggle
which preceded the present insurrection (1868-1878) the agony was
prolonged for ten years. The loss of American property, as well as
the injury to our commercial interests, was very great. President
Hayes said, in his first annual message to Congress, in 1877: " It is
impossible not to feel that it [the insurrection] is attended with
incidents affecting the rights and interests of American citizens.
Apart from the effect of hostilities upon trade between the United
States and Cuba, their progress is inevitably accompanied by complaints having more or less foundation, of searches, arrests, embargoes,
and oppressive taxes upon the property of American residents, and of
unprovoked interference with American vessels and commerce."* In
1874, Secretary Fish, in a communication to Mr. Cushing, had complained that " for any injury done to the United States or their
citizens in Cuba we have no direct means of redress there, but can
obtain it only by slow and circuitous action by way of Madrid." In
the same communication he says: " Meanwhile this condition of
things grows, day by day, more and more insupportable to the United
States. The government is compelled to exert constantly the utmost
vigilance to prevent infringement of our law on the part of the
Cubans purchasing munitions or materials of war, or laboring to fit
out military expeditions in our ports; we are constrained to keep a
large naval force to prevent violations of our sovereignty, either by
the Cubans or the Spaniards, etc." t
The much-needed " series of extensive reforms," of which Secretary
Fish says in a communication dated October 29, 1872, to General
Sickles, " the present ministry of Spain has given assurance to the
public, through their organs of the press, and have confirmed the
assurance to you personally," f have not been carried out except that
of the abolition of slavery, and the result is another insurrection,
perhaps more serious and injurious to our interests than the last, and
the term or outcome of which no man can predict.
Our commerce with Cuba is stated in round numbers to consist
of $82,000,000 worth of imports, and $19,00o,ooo of exports. The
" Statesman's Year Book " for 1895 records, that out of 718,204
tons of sugar, exported from Cuba in 1893, 680,642 tons went
to the United States. During that same year we also imported 7654
hogsheads of molasses. We purchase about two-thirds of the tobacco
* Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i, p. 410.
t Ibid., pp. 397-98.
1 Ibid., p. 389.
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which Cuba raises, and nearly one-half of her cigars. In 1892, Cuba
purchased in our markets a little less than one-third of all her imports
-securing a little over one-third from Spain, and considerably less than
one-third from Great Britain. Her main imports are rice, beef, and
flour-articles which we are desirous of selling.
In determining our policy towards Spain with reference to Cuba,
we have a right not only to consider the actual and temporary loss
which our commerce sustains through those protracted struggles
which Spain seems unable or unwilling to prevent or extinguish, but
we have a right to look to our ultimate and permanent interests.
The number of American citizens domiciled in Cuba and the amount
of American capital invested there is another element in the problem
which must not be ignored. Statistics are here unavailable, but
the number and amount must be large.* Our duty to protect these
people and these interests, and the necessity of fixing both parties
to the contest with responsibility, may make the recognition of Cuban
belligerency imperative at any moment. Up to the present time the
Cubans, desirous of preserving our good will and retaining our sympathy, seem to have furnished this protection of their own accord.
Up to this point we have considered only one class of facts-those
relating to our own peculiar and commercial interests, and the policy
toward which these point may readily be inferred. There is, however,
another class of facts which must be considered and tested before
our decision can be final.
It is not alone sufficient that we follow the line indicated by our own
interests, but unless we would be found guilty of an unfriendly,
almost a hostile act toward Spain, we must convince ourselves that
the struggle now going on in Cuba amounts in fact to a war, for a
recognition of belligerency is simply a recognition of a de faclo state,
viz., that of war, or regulated violence.
The main grounds for refusal to recognize Cuban belligerency during
the previous insurrection, a step, however, which President Grant at
one time at least seems to have contemplated,t are thus summed up
by him in his seventh annual message, 1875: " I fail to find in the
insurrection the existence of such substantial political organization,
real, palpable, and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable
* Sefior Fidel y Pierra, chairman of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee in
New York and former Secretary of the Pan-American Congress of 1889, claims
that not less than $25,000,000 of United States money is vested in Cuban plantrtions, sugar refineries, and other enterprises. Besides there is, it is stated, a sum
estimated at from $o,ooo,ooo to $i5,ooo,ooo advanced by American merchants upon
the Cuban sugar crop of 1896.
t See the recently published extracts by the Associated Press, March iS, from
Hamilton Fish's diary.
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of the ordinary functions of government towards its own people
and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with
a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material,
such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category
of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place
it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency
would aim to elevate it." *
A careful reading of the speeches delivered in Congress t while the
question of the recognition of Cuban belligerency was under discussion in June, 1870, will, I think, convince the skeptic that President
Grant, while absolutely in the right in insisting upon these tests, was
wrong in their application to Cuban affairs, and that he committed a
grave error in allowing his first and better judgment to be overruled
by that of his Secretary of State.t
Among the tests then, accepting the principles laid down by
General Grant and by one of the most exacting and authoritative
writers on international law, which we would apply to the question
* Wharton's "Digest," Vol. i, p. 406.
t Congressional Globe, Second Session, Forty-first Congress, Parts 5 and 6.
$ The Republic of Cuba was organized in April, 1869, by a convention of delegates from the rebellious districts, and a liberal constitution was adopted. Full
legislative powers were given to a House of Representatives, to which body was
also entrusted the nomination of a President and Commander-in-Chief. Sessions
of the assembly were held, and the revolution was general in the central and
eastern portions of the island. The President was assisted by a Cabinet of five
members, and in each State there was an elected Governor; in each district a
Lieutenant-Governor. The districts were divided into prefectships and subprefectships. The prefects and sub-prefects are described as "justices of the peace,
with administrative duties."
The strength and obstinacy of the Cuban resistance can only be judged by the
enormous expenditure of men, money, and effort which it cost Spain to maintain
the struggle during ten years-a struggle in which the Cubans were only induced
to lay down their arms by the promise on the part of General Campos of thorough
and far-reaching reforms. In a debate in the Cortes inL 1876 it was stated that
145,000 soldiers had been sent to Cuba in eight years with little or no result. Up
to 1871, i. e., in three years, Spain had spent $70,339,658.70. By 1871 Spain had
oo,oo men under arms, and was in possession of 52 vessels and 30 gunboats.
In three years, it is said, Spain lost 68,ooo out of 8o,ooo men, while the Cubans lost
only 13,OO; 43,ooo Cubans, however, were under arrest, many of whom were shot
or died in prison.
Of course it must be recognized that a powerful ally of the Cubans was disease
which played a greater part than insurgent ammunition in this fiendish work
of destruction. In 1870 General Jordan, the Commander-in-Chief of the insurgent
forces publicly confessed that there were not in Cuba io,ooo arms.-See articles on
Cuba, in " Encyclopedia Britannica " and "American
also CongressionalGlobe, Second Session, Forty-first Congress, Parts 5 and 6.
Dana, in the above-mentioned note to Wheaton, note 15. it would not have
been difficult to collect from great and highly respected authorities and leading
cases, principles or tests which it would have been much easier to apply to the

Encyclopedia;"

(
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of Cuban belligerency are these: In the first place, is there a " de
facto political organization sufficient in character, population and
resources to constitute it, if left to itself, a state among the nations,
reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a state."
The New York Times on November io, 1895, published a fac-simile
of the Cuban Declaration of Independence and the Provisional Constitution of the Cuban Republic. It appears that this Constitution,
although adopted by elected delegates, is entirely provisional in its
character, and has not established democratic or representative institutions. There is no Congress or representative body, there are no
elective offices (as was the case during the previous revolution), but
at the end of two years an Assembly is to be convened for the purpose
of choosing a new government and revising the Constitution. " The
supreme power of the Republic is vested in a council composed of a
President, Vice-President, and four Secretaries for the dispatch of
War, of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of the Treasury." (Art.
I.) This council exercises all the ordinary functions of sovereignty,
but shall " intervene in the direction of military affairs only when, in
their judgment, it shall be absolutely necessary to do so." * (Art. IV.)
The letters of Mr. Wm. Mannix, t a newspaper correspondent, have
made it clear that Cuba has in her President a man of high character
-a naturalized American, and a regular system of administration
organized, it seems, on the French prefect plan, covering within the
range of its activities from two-thirds to three-fourths of Cuban territory. The number of "pfrefectos " is stated to count up to about 200,
and there are in addition an indefinite number of " sub-fprefeclos."
The prefecto is described by Mr. Mannix as a " combination of
justice of the peace, mayor and general overseer of the people of his
district." They report and are responsible to the President of the
Cuban Republic, by whom they are appointed.1 In January of this
year, the President left his mountain capital, Cubitas, which Mr.
present state of affairs in Cuba than those which have been selected.-e. g., the
opinion expressed by Justice Grier, in The Prize Cases, 2 Black., 665, " when the
party in rebellion occupy and hold in a hostile manner a certain portion of territory; have declared their independence; have cast off their allegiance; have
organized armies; have commenced hostilities against their former sovereign, the
world acknowledges them as belligerents and the contest a war."-See also
Vattel, ? 293-4, and Bluntscbli, g 5-12
*There is an interesting provision to the effect that the property of foreigners,
whose governments recognize the rights of belligerency to Cuba, shall be exempt
from taxation during the revolution.-Art. XX.
t-See e.g., Chicago Inter-Oceanof February 7, io and 27, 1896.
IThe reader will not fail to compare this account of the organization of the
present Cuban Republic with that given of the previous Republic in the foot-note
on p. 82.
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Mannix visited and describes, and made an extended tour of inspection throughout the island, lasting several weeks. During this time
he appointed, it is said, thirty new prefeclos.
Another test of the status of belligerency, as stated by Dana, is "the
actual employment of military forces on each side, acting in accordance with the rules and customs of war, such as the use of flags of
truce, cartels, exchange of prisoners and treatment by the parent
state as prisoners of war."
The number of Cuban forces in the field is variously estimated at
from 20,000 to 50,000 men.*

It seems certain that the Cuban Army is

on a much better war footing to-day than at any time during the previous insurrection. The men seem to be well commanded, and are
amenable to discipline so far as one can judge by the plan of campaign and their occasional successes won against great odds; and they
seem to be fairly well fed, clothed and equipped, although in the
latter respect there is still much to be desired. The fact that a large
number of Spanish soldiers, estimated at from 700 to 1700 men, are

held by the Cubans as prisoners of war, shows that they at least pay
some regard to the usages of civilized warfare. Besides, these prisoners furnish a guarantee that General Weyler will not wholly ignore
those usages. The war, at least as conducted by General Campos, was
carried .on in as humane and praiseworthy a manner as circumstances would permit, and furnishes a noteworthy contrast to the
conduct of both parties during the last Cuban revolution. The
Cubans seem to have in their Commander-in-Chief, General Gomez,
an experienced leader and an able strategist. As long as there is
general unity and responsibility in the plan of campaign, reasonable
method in the madness even of guerilla warfare, an observance of
the rules of war, and capable leadership, I fail to see why the Cuban
manner of fighting should be made a source of reproach to them.
Guerilla warfare has frequently been resorted to by the Spaniards
themselves, and the annals of our own military history show that we
have not always disdained similar methods.
The number of men and the amount of money already expended
by Spain in this contest has been very great. Early last autumn,
the Spanish Prime Minister, in an authorized interview, declared that
a few weeks after the beginning of October would see the end of
the Cuban Rebellion. Since then the rebellion has extended over
the greater part of the island, and Havana itself has been threatened.
Virtually, the whole Spanish Army is in service in Cuba, and the
number of soldiers who have been sent to Cuba probably exceeds
* The latter estimate is that of General Gomez himself, and of course its accuracy cannot be trusted. Probably the lowest estimate is nearest the truth.
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120,000 men. In an interview on December 4, 1895, General Campos
is reported to have said: "The war is of more importance than I
was at first willing to believe or admit. The insurgents are no
longer confined to any particular district, but are all over the
island." *
The third and last test of the status of belligerency as stated by
Dana is " at sea, the employment by the insurgents of commissioned
cruisers, and the exercise by the parent state of the rights of blockade
of insurgent ports, of stopping and searching neutral vessels at sea."
No writer or authority so far as I know, including even Dana himself,
holds this test to be one which is absolutely essential. He merely
claims that it is more decisive than the others. It is in fact conclusive, and if this test can be applied, recognition almost follows as a
matter of course. To hold this to be an essential test of the fact of
belligerency, would imply a denial that war can be carried on solely
on land.
It is certainly true that the favorite argument in the newspapers"because the Spaniards are cruel, therefore we ought to recognize the
belligerency of the Cubans "-is not based on any principle of international law. But a recognition of Cuban belligerency would, under
the circumstances, we hold, be the exercise of a strictly legal right,
and being under no special obligations to Spain, there would be no
impropriety on our part in following the lines indicated by our own
sympathy and interests-temporary and ultimate-i. e., to assist Cuba
in the only possible way which is legally permissible, viz., by recognizing her belligerency.*
Amos S. HERSHEY.
State University, Bloomington, Ind.

ADAM SMITH AND JAMES ANDERSON.

In spite of the suggestiveness of certain passages in the " Wealth
of Nations," it seems clear that Adam Smith conceived rent as a constituent element, determining, and not as a differential surplus,
determined by marginal price. There is no evidence in the numerous
editions of the " Wealth of Nations " published during Smith's lifetime, nor in any of his recorded utterances, of a change of opinion
in this direction, in the interval from 1776 to his death in 1790. This
cannot be explained by the mere failure of his written thought to
attract criticism. Hume's dissent is familiar: " I cannot think that
the rent of farms makes any part of the price of the produce, but that
* New York Times, December 4, 1895.
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